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Response
There Is No New General Common Law of
Severability
Kevin C. Walsh*
Severability doctrine is in rough shape and has been for quite some
time. But one long-settled feature of that doctrine is that the severability of a
state law is a question of state law.1 In The New General Common Law of
Severability, however, Professor Ryan Scoville argues that the Supreme
Court has recently—and wrongly—changed course.2 This contention caps
his detailed history of the development of the Supreme Court’s approach to
the vertical choice of law issue in severability determinations.
Professor Scoville claims that the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England initiated a “broad
federalization” of severability doctrine, a course change confirmed by
subsequent Supreme Court decisions.3 By departing from the rule that the
severability of a state law is a question of state law, Scoville further
contends, the Supreme Court has exceeded post-Erie limits on the
appropriate scope of federal common lawmaking power.4
Professor Scoville’s rich rendering of changes in severability doctrine
over time provides a wealth of insights into bygone judicial approaches to
severability. But his criticisms of the Supreme Court’s purportedly new
general common law of severability are misplaced insofar as they are

* Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) (per curiam) (“Severability is of course
a matter of state law.”).
2. Ryan Scoville, The New General Common Law of Severability, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 543
(2013).
3. Id. at 571.
4. Id. at 593.
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premised on the claim that the Supreme Court has changed the established
vertical choice of law rule requiring federal courts to use state law in
deciding whether a state law is severable. The Court has made no such
change. Ayotte does set forth guidelines for federal courts’ use of
severability doctrine in crafting remedies for partially unconstitutional
statutes. But those guidelines are consistent with the continued dependence
of state-law severability on state law.
To deny Professor Scoville’s specific claim of doctrinal discontinuity is
not to dismiss the lack of judicial doctrinal rigor that he reveals with his
thorough review of severability decisions past and present. Federal courts
from the top of the federal judicial hierarchy to the bottom are all over the
map in the authorities they use and the arguments they make about
severability. But judicial sloppiness in implementing severability doctrine
should be criticized as careless drift rather than unjustified innovation.
In this solicited response to The New General Common Law of
Severability, I first offer an interpretation of Ayotte and subsequent Supreme
Court decisions as continuous with existing doctrine instead of a departure
from it. I then suggest that much of Scoville’s evidence for a federalization
of severability doctrine is better viewed as evidence of doctrinal looseness
rather than of doctrinal change. I conclude by returning to the lessons of
severability’s doctrinal history, suggesting that the prehistory of severability
doctrine may supply a better guide for how courts should deal with problems
of partial unconstitutionality in the future.
I.
To understand the role of severability doctrine in Ayotte, one must first
understand more broadly what the Supreme Court did in the case. In a
unanimous decision authored by Justice O’Connor, the Court overturned a
decision that held a New Hampshire law facially unconstitutional.5 That law,
which prohibited physicians from performing an abortion on a minor without
prior notification to a parent, had some exceptions and a judicial bypass.6
But the statute did not have a general health exception.7 The district court
held that this omission rendered the statute facially unconstitutional.8 The
court therefore enjoined the statute’s enforcement completely, and the First
Circuit affirmed.9 On review, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts
should not have made such a sweeping ruling without first considering more
targeted injunctive relief.10

5. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–32 (2006).
6. Id. at 323–24.
7. Id. at 324.
8. Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Heed, 296 F. Supp.2d 59, 65 (D.N.H. 2003).
9. See id. at 68; Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir.
2004).
10. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331.
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The Supreme Court’s reasoning in reversing the holding of facial
unconstitutionality is straightforward. The key move was the Court’s
observation that most applications of the statute would raise no constitutional
difficulty.11 That is because the absence of a health exception from a
parental notification requirement would normally make no difference to the
health of a minor seeking an abortion. As the Court saw it, a constitutional
problem from the lack of a health exception in the statute would arise from
the statute’s potential enforcement only in those relatively rare
circumstances, such as a medical emergency, in which the delay from
seeking parental notification (or judicial bypass) would be harmful to the
minor’s health.12 The Supreme Court then reasoned, quite sensibly, that the
judicial solution should be tailored to the constitutional problem—in that
case, a problem limited to enforcement of the statute in a narrow set of
circumstances.13 If targeted injunctive relief enjoining the enforcement of
the statute in only those circumstances would be consistent with legislative
intent, then that is what the district court should have ordered while leaving
the state free to enforce the statute more generally.14
It is only at this point that severability doctrine enters into the remedial
calculus in Ayotte. Specifically, the opinion reasons that severability
doctrine requires a court weighing the issuance of a targeted injunction
against enforcement in some circumstance but not others to ask: “Would the
legislature have preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all?”15
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Ayotte never suggests that
the question of what the state legislature intended regarding severability is
anything other than a question of state law. To the contrary, the opinion
affirmatively indicates that the question of legislative intent is a question of
state law. The opinion not only notes the presence of a severability clause in
the New Hampshire law, but also observes that this could be countered by
the challengers’ contention “that New Hampshire legislators preferred no
statute at all to a statute enjoined in the way we have described.”16 Neither of
these considerations about state law would have been worth noting if the
relevant question of legislative intent were not a question of state law.
Because the answer to the question of legislative intent remained “open”
under the Court’s decision, the Court remanded “for the lower courts to
determine legislative intent in the first instance.”17

11. Id.
12. See id. at 328, 331 (describing the factual basis as the following: “In some very small
percentage of cases, pregnant minors, like adult women, need immediate abortions to avoid serious
and often irreversible damage to their health.”).
13. Id. at 328–29.
14. Id. at 329–31.
15. Id. at 330.
16. Id. at 331.
17. Id.
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The Court’s opinion in Ayotte did nothing to unsettle the expectation
that the lower courts on remand should make the legislative intent
determination in accordance with state law. As Professor Scoville notes, that
is how the parties briefed the issue on remand.18 And that is how the district
court understood its task as well. The district court never ultimately decided
the severability question because an election intervened and the newly
constituted legislature repealed the parental notification law. But in deciding
a different issue, the district court explained that the Supreme Court had
“remanded the case to have the lower court divine the intent of the New
Hampshire legislature and to fashion a remedy accordingly.”19
In sum, although Professor Scoville rejects a reading under which
“Ayotte did not in fact establish a severability test,”20 that is the best reading
of the case. Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court left the question of
severability to be decided on remand and did nothing to modify the rule that
the severability of a state law is a question to be decided on the basis of state
law.
Nor do any post-Ayotte decisions by the Supreme Court register
doctrinal change in this area. Professor Scoville describes the Court’s
decision in Randall v. Sorrell as “adopting Ayotte’s method of deciding
severance without following state law.”21 But Justice Breyer’s opinion in
Randall makes no mention of Ayotte and even cites a state severability
statute.22 Professor Scoville discounts the state law citation because it
appears at the end of a string cite after two Supreme Court cases.23 But the
first Supreme Court precedent in the string cite sets forth the same standard
as the state severability statute cited by the Court.24 And the other Supreme
Court precedent in the string cite says that severability is “essentially an
inquiry into legislative intent.”25 Finally, if Justice Breyer thought that
severability was to be determined based on federal common law rather than
state law, it is hard to explain why the citation to the state statute is in his
Randall opinion at all.
Professor Scoville also enlists the Supreme Court’s decisions in Free
Enterprise v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board and National
18. Scoville, supra note 2, at 589.
19. Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Ayotte, 571 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273 (D.N.H. 2008)
(emphasis added).
20. Scoville, supra note 2, at 570.
21. Id. at 571.
22. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006).
23. Scoville, supra note 2, at 571 n.190.
24. Randall, 548 U.S. at 262. Compare Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S.
210, 234 (1932) (“[T]he invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as law.”), with
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 215 (2003) (“If any provision of an act is invalid, or if any application
thereof to any person or circumstance is invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or
applications which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.”).
25. Randall, 548 U.S. at 262 (quoting Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526
U.S. 172, 191 (1999)).
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Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius in support of his claim that
there is a new general common law of severability.26 Those cases both dealt
with the severability of a federal statute, and are thus of limited utility. But
Professor Scoville rightly observes that opinions in both of these federal-law
cases cite a portion of the Ayotte opinion that the foregoing analysis has not
addressed. That is the Court’s statement in Ayotte that “[w]e prefer . . . to
sever [a partially unconstitutional statute’s] problematic portions while
leaving the remainder intact . . . .”27 This expression of a general preference
in favor of severability could be viewed as a federal severance guideline of
sorts. But there is no reason to take it as licensing the federalization of statestatute severability determinations. The statement appears in a preface to the
Court’s actual analysis.28 And that analysis not only employs the principle
that legislative intent is “the touchstone,” but also makes clear that the
relevant intent is the intent of the state legislature.29
Professor Scoville argues that the Ayotte Court’s statement of a general
preference favoring severability is significant because “whether to sever the
unconstitutional applications of the New Hampshire statute was the central
question on remand.”30 But the opinion provides no indication that the lower
courts were to take the statement of a general preference for severability as
authoritative in ascertaining the intent of the New Hampshire legislature.
The Court’s expressions of a general preference for severing as one way of
tailoring the solution to the problem sets up the requirement for the lower
courts to consider partial invalidation before wholesale. As it is best read,
Ayotte instructs that courts should sever if they can, but the determination of
whether they can depends on legislative intent.
While I deny that the Court “federalized the severability of state
statutes” in Ayotte, I acknowledge that the decision could be said to have
“created federal severance guidelines for state statutes in federal court.” 31
But those guidelines do not relate to the vertical choice of law issue. They
are directives about when to undertake a severability inquiry (viz., before
rendering a statute completely unenforceable) and about what severability
depends upon (viz., legislative intent). These guidelines do not purport to
render state law irrelevant to the determination of the severability of state
laws. Indeed, it is the dependence of severability on legislative intent that
makes the severability of state law a question of state law.
It is certainly possible for courts to interpret Ayotte’s statement of a
general preference for severability as requiring a thumb on the scale in favor
of severability when weighing a state legislature’s intent regarding the

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Scoville, supra note 2, at 546–47.
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006).
Id.
Id. at 330.
Scoville, supra note 2, at 570.
Id. at 547.
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severability of state law. But because such an interpretation fits neither the
context for the statement in Ayotte nor the general doctrinal context, that
interpretation should be rejected.
II.
Although there is no new general common law of severability, the ad
hoc nature of most severability determinations lends some plausibility to
Professor Scoville’s interpretation of Ayotte and subsequent cases. But the
better takeaway from cases that seem to depart from the established approach
in this area is that courts (including the Supreme Court) are sometimes
imprecise or loose in their citation and decision practices regarding
severability.
It is not uncommon for federal court severability decisions to include an
indiscriminate mish-mash of authorities, lumping together cases deciding the
severability of a state law with cases deciding the severability of a federal
law. Ayotte itself illustrates the mixing of authorities that one occasionally
sees in judicial discussions of severability. Consider, for example, the
Court’s statement that “[a]fter finding an application or portion of a statute
unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred
what is left of its statute to no statute at all?”32 This statement is followed by
a lengthy string cite that refers to seven Supreme Court cases spanning from
1879 to 2005. Four of these cases involved the severability of a federal
law,33 two involved the severability of a state law,34 and one involved the
severability of an Executive Order.35 But one should not make doctrinal hay
from these disparate straws. One should infer, perhaps, only that severability
depends on legislative intent, not that the Court was attempting to formulate
a definitive test for severability or trying to provide guidance about the
source of law to use in determining the severability of a state law.
Even when one limits one’s focus to a single case, the extent to which
the Supreme Court believed a particular severability determination to rest on
federal law or state law can be unclear. For example, Professor Scoville
describes the Supreme Court’s 1932 decision in Champlin Refining Co. v.
Corporation Commission of Oklahoma as a pre-Erie case that decided
whether a state statute was severable without reliance on the applicable state
law test.36 And that description appears accurate. A look at Champlin
Refining does not reveal any Supreme Court citations of Oklahoma

32. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330.
33. United States v. Booker 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S.
678, 684 (1987); The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 501 (1908); Trade-Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 98–99 (1879).
34. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932); Allen v.
Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83–84 (1881).
35. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999).
36. Scoville, supra note 2, at 571.
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severability precedents. But in a 1992 decision about the severability of an
Oklahoma law, the Supreme Court described Champlin Refining as a
decision “inquiring into severability under Oklahoma law . . . .”37
In this area of the law, then, it is unsurprising to see a federal court
citing Ayotte in deciding the severability of a state law.38 Nor is it significant
that some courts cite Ayotte alongside citations of state-court precedents
about the severability of state law.39 This sort of mixture need not be viewed
as a sign of “broad federalization,”40 but rather should be viewed as a sign of
doctrinal looseness generally.
Professor Scoville argues that this intermixing (whether deliberate or
not) matters because federal severance guidelines “materially differ from a
number of state doctrines.”41 To be sure, the verbal formulations of some
state-law severability doctrines differ from how the Supreme Court has
formulated its approach to federal-law severability in recent years. But these
verbal formulations would lead to different outcomes only if the verbal
formulations actually guided the severability determinations.
Professor Scoville offers a stylized example to suggest that different
formulations could lead to different outcomes. But even under the conditions
set forth in that example, it is far from clear that the different verbal
formulations of doctrine would lead to different outcomes. Scoville’s
illustrative example has the following features: the hypothetical statute has
three operative provisions; there is no severability clause; only one of the
three provisions is unconstitutional; and there is legislative history that
makes clear that the legislature would have passed the statute without that
unconstitutional provision. Scoville argues that this statute would be
severable under the approach he finds in Ayotte, but that the statute would
likely not be severable in Tennessee and South Carolina. That is because
Tennessee requires “fairly clear” evidence favoring severance from the plain
text of the statute, and South Carolina “has a presumption against severance
in the absence of a statutory severability clause.”42 I am less confident about
what would happen in those states. Courts in both Tennessee and South
Carolina have severed provisions from statutes upon concluding that is what
the legislature would have wanted, either notwithstanding the absence of a
severability clause or without noting the presence or absence of such a
clause.43 Such decisions do not prove that the verbal formulations of each

37. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 460 (1992).
38. See sources cited in Scoville, supra note 2, at 571–72 n.192.
39. See sources cited in id. at 572 n.193.
40. Id. at 571.
41. Id. at 572.
42. Id. at 573.
43. See Thomas v. Cooper River Park, 471 S.E.2d 170, 171 (S.C. 1996) (finding a statutory
provision separable without any mention of a severability clause); Thayer v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 413
S.E.2d 810, 814–15 (S.C. 1992) (per curiam) (same); Nolichuckey Sand Co. v. Huddleston, 896
S.W.2d 782, 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (“A long line of Tennessee Supreme Court decisions
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state’s doctrine are necessarily irrelevant, but they do suggest that they are
less constraining in application than might appear from the words
themselves. The question is one of judgment, I suppose. My own
impression from reviewing numerous severability decisions of both state and
federal courts is that—in this particular area of the law, at least—the verbal
formulations do not much matter.44
Suppose, though, that the verbal formulation of a state’s severability law
were to be crystal clear in leaving no wiggle room to avoid inseverability in a
certain class of cases. What then? Suppose, for example, that a state’s
highest court were to hold that severability is not an available judicial tool for
saving a partially unconstitutional state statute that violates the dormant
Commerce Clause through differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
businesses in separate provisions.45 Now suppose that a federal court
confronts just such a statute at a later time. Would Ayotte or any other
Supreme Court decision post-dating the establishment of the rule that the
severability of a state law is a question of state law really authorize the
federal court to ignore the rule of state severability law established by the
state’s highest court? For all the reasons given up to this point, I think the
answer has to be an emphatic no. According to Professor Scoville’s analysis,
however, the answer is a regretful yes. We disagree.
III.
Whether or not Ayotte marked a change, there is little doubt from
Professor Scoville’s detailed history of approaches to vertical choice of law
in severability doctrine that the Supreme Court has not been very selfconscious about shaping that specific part of severability doctrine.
Moreover, Professor Scoville properly observes that the Court has not
explained most of its doctrinal shifts regarding severability doctrine more
generally, and he rightly endorses David Gans’ observation that
“[s]everability doctrine’s strictures are routinely ignored.”46 These critical
observations—unfortunately—echo the critical observations in Robert

support[s] our conclusion that elision [i.e. severance] is appropriate under the circumstances of the
case at bar, even without a severability clause . . . .”).
44. Cf. Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV.
L. REV. 76, 101–02 (1937) (“The only general conclusion which can be drawn from the above
analysis of what the Supreme Court has both said and done in solving the problem of separable
applications is that the Court avails itself of one formula or another in order to justify results which
seem to it to be desirable for other reasons.”).
45. Cf. American Petroleum Inst. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 677 S.E.2d 16, 20 (S.C. 2009)
(holding that severability is unavailable to remedy violations of the state constitution’s one-subject
rule).
46. See Scoville, supra note 2 at 546 (quoting David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial
Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 651 (2008)).
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Stern’s seminal history of severability doctrine from seven-and-a-half
decades ago.47
It is a real problem that thoughtful analysts continue to find severability
doctrine insusceptible of principled application after all this time. But while
the history of severability doctrine is unedifying, its prehistory holds out the
promise of a better approach to partial unconstitutionality. As Professor
Scoville points out, severability doctrine based on legislative intent took
shape in the mid-to-late 1800s.48 But courts were dealing with the problem
of partial unconstitutionality for decades before that. I have described that
older approach elsewhere, and note it here as an alternative to modern
severability doctrine.49 That is because the main lesson to draw from the
history of severability doctrine may be that courts should give up trying to
use it and scholars should give up trying to fix it. Perhaps, instead, we
should move forward using a reconstructed version of the original approach
to partial unconstitutionality.

47. See Stern, supra note 44, at 76-77 (explaining that severability doctrine “has been
embroidered by the Supreme Court with negative and positive presumptions, and with conflicting
rules, some of which are applied in some cases and some in others—usually without any explicit
recognition that they conflict”).
48. See Scoville, supra note 2 at 545 n.10 (describing ninteenth-century decisions which
emphasized legislative intent).
49. See Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 755–68 (2010)
(describing how courts dealt with partial unconstitutionality before the rise of the modern
legislative-intent-based approach).
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